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1) Bush blames Kerry for not supporting our soldiers, then points fingers at a bunch of PRIVATES when he gets blamed for this stuff. 2) Some Iraqi preacher was going on about "how could these people do it and enjoy it?" Images of two civilian contractors burned alive, pulled into pieces, then hung from a bridge while random Iraqis (not soldiers, mind you) rejoiced come to mind. 3) Peeing on your head? -*BAD WORD*-, are you kidding? Sounds like a fraternity initiation. Ever hear of Vietnam? How about Nazi Death Camps? ---- Anyway I don't really believe its not a problem, but thats what happens in these places. Did you really ever think otherwise? Oh, and sure, the CIA doesn't torture people. Three generations ago, the generation was defined by intra-European Conflict. Two generations ago, by the Cold War. One generation ago, by Vietnam and the transition to American Hegemony. This generation... mark down my prediction... The 21st Century Race Wars.

You need to know what happened to be able to form an opinion, so please . The Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gore. The US Supreme Court overruled them. According to the Cons!@#$%^&*ution, States may chose their representatives in the electoral college any way they chose. The Governor may appoint the representatives, if thats what their State Cons!@#$%^&*ution says. Where the USSC gets juristiction to tell States what to do, tell me. Powers not specifically enumerated are reserved for the States. Given your recent post about Democrat hypocrisy, please riddle me this; why aren't the Republicans up in arms about this clear violation of State rights? The counter-argument, which I'll actually present, is that the USSC had to protect voting equality. But that argument has far more holes; plenty of people don't have their ballots counted, and plenty are thrown out. Democrats hypocrisy in this case is far less clear. Its easy to pretend you have an opinion, please stop.

Using historical "evidence" to predict the future of the United States as a hegemon isn't likely to provide substantial predictions. Yes, every hegemon has fallen, but no, no modern Republic hegemon has. The world is simply a different place now. Hegemons tend to appear after major world conflicts (US emerging after WW2, before that, Britain following 100-years war, etc.) In the current state of technology, such a brutal war would be a nuclear one, and most likely no hegemon would emerge, since there wouldn't be anything left. In other words, I think it is "US or bust" - the kind of war it requires to overtake the US as the primary power would be nuclear, and would end the world. GG.

Its perfectly logical that the United States have nuclear weapons and no one else have them. Read the second post - the US is a democracy held back by its own domestic complexities. The way the government works is open enough that it becomes believable that it is safe for the US to have nukes. Not that they should, but it'd be a more dangerous world if the US didn't.

It means "operating under the !@#$%^&*umption that". You can't talk about anything if you don't make !@#$%^&*umptions. I just happen to be nice enough to define mine.

I lied. Here is the second one now. This one is about whether or not domestic ins!@#$%^&*utions matter in international cooperation. ----- The common !@#$%^&*umption that states are unitary actors is wrong - international cooperation is a two-level game in which domestic politics matters. At the core of this argument is the realization that negotiators must balance credible commitments with positive outcomes. That is to say, in international negotiation, a country has to “win” the first level of the game by striking a deal, and the second level of the game by striking a good deal. The definition of a “good” deal varies between politicians, but invariably involves an increase in either their domestic popularity or their grasp on power (which is, in a democracy, nearly synonymous). A win set is the group of outcomes that are satisfactory to the negotiator surrounding the “ideal point” at the center of the set. A win set must be sufficiently large so that it overlaps the win set of the other international negotiating party, insuring that a deal is made and the first level of the game is won. A win set must be sufficiently small so that the resulting outcome is close enough to the ideal point to satisfy the negotiators desire for domestic popularity.Because the second influence on the size of a win set exists, by inference, domestic politics and ins!@#$%^&*utions must matter in international negotiation and cooperation. To further understand why domestic politics matter, we must understand a negotiator’s incentives, their real win set, and the win set they want others to perceive. Once we establish that domestic politics matter, we can begin to understand what the affect of these domestic politics are on international cooperation. In international negotiation, under the !@#$%^&*umption that cooperation is mutually beneficial, each party is harmed if no agreement is reached. Each party wants an outcome as close to their ideal point as possible, but there is an implicit !@#$%^&*umption that someone, somewhere, must compromise, unless the two negotiating parties want exactly the same thing. If one party claims that there is only one point at which a deal can be reached, the other party will realize that for any deal to be made, the deal must be at exactly that point, and will submit. This creates the incentive to lie about your win set. But this incentive is no secret – it holds true for every negotiating party. Even parties who truly have only one point at which they can reach an agreement will be perceived as lying, since “talk is cheap.” Anyone can claim to know how to cure an ailment, but we only trust people who have proven themselves by getting a doctorate of medicine. This is a credible signal – a way of !@#$%^&*uring that you are not bluffing. A signal is not credible if it is cheap; if doctors only went to school for a week, the signal would not be credible. However, doctors are schooled for at least 8 years, credibly signaling that they know what they are doing. How can a signal be credible in the arena of international negotiation? In a democracy, specifically one with a vocal and free populace, if public opinion is vastly for or against an international agreement, it credibly signals that the negotiating politician’s outcome must coincide with popular opinion, or he will lose the next election. The same may or may not hold true for non-democratic governments, but regardless, the signal is less credible if it is remotely possible to maintain power despite public opinion (as in a dictatorship). The result is that democracies can credibly signal that their win set is small, and therefore achieve an outcome closer to their ideal point than otherwise. Without the domestic political ins!@#$%^&*ution of elections, this signal is only “cheap talk.” Using the example of the game of chicken – throw your steering wheel out the window and your opponent knows he has to be the one to swerve. Understanding costs to politicians is essential in the process of international cooperation. Democratic politicians use domestic ins!@#$%^&*utions to generate audience costs – the loss of “face” or popularity in the domestic arena if they are forced to back down from their position on the negotiating table. The President of the United States has a potentially more powerful bargaining chip if he claims in his State of the Union address his position in an international negotiation, and !@#$%^&*ures the American people that he will get this exact outcome. It appears counterintuitive to generate costs for yourself if you do not achieve your lofty goal, but the subtlety is your signal to the negotiator on the other side of the table that you have no choice but to achieve this goal, or you will lose the next election. Generating costs for yourself is a political tool to credible signal that your win set is small. It is a credible commitment, a costly change in the negotiators actions to prove that he is committed to his position. Generating these costs show that under no cir-*BAD WORD*-stance will the negotiator back down. In a unitary state actor model, negotiators operate under the !@#$%^&*umption that what is beneficial for the nation is beneficial for the negotiator. This !@#$%^&*umption does not work if we are under the !@#$%^&*umption that individual politicians/negotiators are primarily concerned with re-election or, in a non-democratic state, with maintaining power. The latter !@#$%^&*umption is more believable. While evidence is abundant, a shining example is the United States’ political parties shifting platforms to capture popularity that has led them to the complete opposite from their original positions in the 19th century. If we can believe that politicians are motivated by maintaining power, we can not also believe that domestic politics do not matter in the international arena. If imposing tariffs on imported steel wins a politician several key votes for reelection, while not simultaneously losing any other votes from international backlash in the form of other tariffs (perhaps because public perception is that it is not the politician’s fault), that politician will take (and as recent history shows, has taken) a negotiating stance both unbeneficial and unpopular to the nation as a whole. If domestic politics does not matter, this situation is unachievable and illogical for the politician. In the United States system of winner-take-all elections, overemphasis is given to the swing votes in negotiation. In a system of partial representation, negotiation has no bias – there are no swing votes. Although their involvement may not always be direct, legislatures/parliaments (domestic ins!@#$%^&*utions) have an important effect on international cooperation. Legislatures are “picky” – the representatives of Pittsburg are unhappy when steel tariffs are lowered, even if the representatives of two other states are better off because of it. Because passing something by a legislature involves so much compromise, the deal needs to be “sweet” to begin with. Having a picky legislature is a credible signal that the negotiator needs a deal that may actually be passed by his legislature. In effect, it proves that the win set is small. The pickier the legislature, the smaller the win set, the better the deal the country will get on the negotiating table. Because international cooperation is about achieving the result closest to the ideal point of the negotiator, all negotiators have the incentive to show that the set of possible outcomes that they can credibly commit to domestically must be small. Indicating that this win set is small is cheap talk unless there is some credible signal, and domestic politics dictates the credibility of this signal. Elections, generated audience costs, and legislatures credibly signal that win sets are small. As such, democracies tend to have a smaller win set the pickier they are. Weak domestic ins!@#$%^&*utions incapable of ratifying deals unless they are extremely beneficial can actually translate to a powerful international presence on the negotiating table. The true win set of a negotiator is irrelevant if they can get others to perceive their win set as smaller than it is, but this is impossible without some tool to credibly signal that the perceived win set is real. Domestic ins!@#$%^&*utions are this tool, and as such, extremely important in international cooperation. ٱ

My latest. I'll have another for you tommorow. As always, enjoy. This one is pretty basic; the next will be a little more in depth about how international cooperation is dictated by domestic politics. I glaze over some important topics because they're too basic to go into depth with ... (translation: omg i r teh l33t smart hax0r). -------- Even if all countries share similar interests and want cooperation, sometimes cooperation fails. What are the main impediments to cooperation? How can these issues be overcome? Cooperation that would be beneficial to all parties does not always succeed – collective action problems arise involving the problem of public goods and informational asymmetry, distorting the similar interests of the countries involved. (Domestic politics and defection strategies also can prevent cooperation, but are not covered within). Collective action problems often emerge when the cooperation deals with a “public good” – that is, when a potential cooperator will receive the same payoff even if they do not cooperate. This results in the public good being underprovided – since although everyone might want the same thing, each hopes another will pay the cost for it. Informational asymmetries are the imperfection of intelligence for each potential cooperator, a problem that has a negative effect on one or both parties. However, there is a solution to each of these problems; using difficultly constructed international ins!@#$%^&*utions. Olson describes a collection action problem as participants having a common interest in the collective benefit with no common interest in paying the cost of the common good (pp. 21). That is to say, the worst outcome is if nobody pays the cost, but each party would be better off if the other paid the entire cost. It is the prisoner’s dilemma; both parties would be well off cooperating, would be best off if they defect and the other cooperates, and would be worst off if both parties defected. If two countries have trade barriers on each other’s exports, they would each be better off by dropping the tariffs, but whoever does so first loses their bargaining chip. The question to international cooperation then becomes – “does this cost of cooperation ever get paid?” Public goods are at the root of this problem according to Gowa. A public good is “non-rival” in that one party’s consumption does not interfere with another party’s consumption, and “non-excludable” in that anyone can reap the benefit of the good, once the cost has been paid, regardless of whether they paid the cost or not. In small groups, it is easy to watch who pays for the good and who uses it, but the same does not hold for large groups (like the international domain). This leads to the “free-rider” problem, where anyone can benefit from the good without paying the cost, and often without anyone knowing they are receiving the benefit. An obvious problem arises; who will pay the cost if they will be able to reap the same benefit, regardless? International Organizations provide a mechanism for dealing with the political public good problem. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a good example to walk through; it keeps troubled nations afloat in the interest of the world economy. The outcome of a strong world economy is beneficial to the entire world, but the actual donation of resources towards keeping troubled economies from collapsing is a public good. The IMF solves this by giving voting power within the ins!@#$%^&*ution based on funds allocated to the ins!@#$%^&*ution. The benefit to nations on the giving end of IMF funds is manifest through their right to argue and vote for what to do with those funds. The ins!@#$%^&*ution insures that the common good is usually advanced. Informational asymmetry also prevents cooperation in otherwise ideal situations. The market for lemons (meaning bad used cars) is the perfect example. If one out of every ten cars is a lemon (worthless), but the only way to judge the worth of a car is to ask the seller (who will always say his is the best car on the market), what will happen to the market for used cars? A seller might want to sell his car for $10,000, but to hedge against the chance that it is a lemon, the buyer will only want to pay $9,000 for it. For the nine sellers who know their car is in good shape, they will refuse to sell for less than the real price, so the only people who actually buy cars will be getting lemons. This information asymmetry causes a market in which there is an unsatisfied demand. Nine out of ten sellers, and all buyers, would be better off if there was a credible way to signal that a car was not a lemon. In this particular example, the way to credibly signal, and eliminate informational asymmetry, is to build an ins!@#$%^&*ution that inspects cars. This example transposes onto the international level. Countries are best off with a small win set, because then other countries will have to be the ones who compromise to make their own win set overlap. Sometimes, countries really do have small win sets, especially democracies, but more often they pretend that the win sets are smaller than they really are. Politicians benefit by claiming that too much compromise on their part is impossible because of domestic politics. Because of this, in the international world, an information asymmetry makes it difficult to bargain between nations. If two nations have win sets that really overlap (but each is pretending their win set is smaller, and therefore doesn’t overlap), and neither is willing to compromise, a mutually beneficial outcome may not occur. International ins!@#$%^&*utions can correct these asymmetries through public opinion polls, like the Eurobarometer. When such public opinion polls are available internationally, it enables countries to negotiate without informational asymmetries about domestic politics. This isn’t the only kind of information provided; international ins!@#$%^&*utions also provide a set of norms and standards for international negotiation. With these standards, two countries enter negotiation knowing what to expect. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is currently the predominant international organization that attempts to correct these informational asymmetries. For domestic reasons, the United States likes to protect steel. The reason (which is complex, but for our purposes, will be “domestic popularity”) is not acceptable to other countries. Steel tariffs are beneficial to only a small steel producing group in the United States, but are bad for US consumers of anything that requires steel as an input, as well as producers of steel in the World Market. If there were no steel tariffs, it would be best for the common good. The WTO is the organization that insures this common good is advanced, by preventing unfair trade practices. Without this organization, one of two outcomes might occur; first, the other countries could roll over and let the US continue with unfair trade policies that hurt the “common good” or, secondly, a trade war might ensue that eliminates free trade and again results in hurting the “common good.” The WTO, ruling to eliminate unfair trade practices, so far has been important enough to the countries involved that they respect the rulings. As long as countries continue to care about the long-term “game,” they will likely tolerate the short term loss from losing a WTO ruling. Even though we have accepted that all states want the same thing, and we have rationalized how cooperation can fail anyway, is it believable? What real-world examples show this fundamental egoist problem in advancing the common good? Simmons provides a striking example while discussing the gold-standard in the interwar period. A gold-standard implies that there is a “world money supply.” Certain rules, imposed internationally, were intended to promote the common good of a recovering world economy. But domestic implications affected the ability for the common good to be advanced. Central banks were simply unable to collectively act in the common good while also advancing domestic concerns, despite the common interest in maintaining the world economy. Why is this collective action so difficult? Olson seems to capture the reason when he states that “if the firms in an industry are maximizing profits, the profits for the industry as a whole will be less than they otherwise might be.” (pp. 10). But are countries like firms? Firms are profit maximizing, and in most cases their wealth is absolute; that is to say, their well-being is not relative to the well-being of their compe!@#$%^&*ors. We can not assume the same holds true for countries. Power, from a realist perspective, is relative to the compe!@#$%^&*ion. A particular trade policy might make the U.S. a little better off, but make China much better off; there is not a definite way to evaluate whether this policy is “good” or “bad.” This raises concerns for me about whether the arena of international cooperation is captured in the theory of collection action problems, which !@#$%^&*umes there exists some common good. Yet, this by no means indicates that studying the issues of collective action problems involving public goods and information asymmetry is worthless. The advancement of a theoretical common good can be the byproduct of a selfish egoist hegemon, of a benevolent world hegemon, or of a seemingly problematic international ins!@#$%^&*ution. It does not matter how the collective action problem is solved, which is how cooperation (or the lack thereof) can be understood in the real world. !@#$%^&*uming there exists a common good that all states want, cooperation is impeded by collective action problems of underprovided public goods and informational asymmetry which can potentially be solved by international ins!@#$%^&*utions of sufficient import that states are willing to abide by its rulings in an iterated game.

It doesn't matter whether gay marriage is right or not, or if a politician believes in it or not. You can not write inequality into the Cons!@#$%^&*ution. No matter how conservative the Renquist Court is, it will not allow this. I totally believe in this Supreme Court to do so. The problem is that there is a quite clear super majority of anti-gay-marriage laws supporters around the country. It is absolutely obvious that if a Presidential candidate supported Gay marriage it would cost him a vital amount of voters. Yet, it is quite clear the far left will be alienated by this stance the Democrats are forced to take (Kerry already came out against gay marriages, no pun intended). The result is a divide in the democratic party, added with the richest campaign ever compared to a near broke one, on top of the en-*BAD WORD*-bancy, and Bush can't lose.

It also showed the real person who had the ball. It was as if there were 2 balls, one being permanently (no carry time) carried by a person... but he could also catch and throw the other ball.

For the first time ever, last night, I witnessed a strange bug. In ?go ip of SSCX Hockey Zone, during a league game, a player without the ball permanently showed his name red, followed by "(Ball)", as if he was carrying the ball. This did not change when he got the ball and when he passed it away. I cured the problem by leaving the arena and rejoining, but later it happened again to another player. Again I left and returned, and I haven't seen this since. My specifications are the same as they have been since .39pr1 came out - I use that, WinXP, GeForce4 4600 - don't know what else you might want. Anyway, while this isn't a crash-bug or anything totally serious, it makes it hard to play HZ well. I had to quit the arena and come back during a league game - good thing it didn't happen at an inopportune time. This bug was reported to me by another person as well, but no one else seemed to be experiencing it.

There really needs to be a way to move players instead of kick them. In zones that have small public arenas, it would be priceless to be able to evenly distribute players across arenas.

er

Can you set up a redirecting link in your SSC zone forums over to www.rshl.org/phpbb? Thanks chums. Toodles.

=P read my post First Bretton Woods, then the Snake, then the European Monetary System. Now, the European Union and European Monetary Union. Ever since the middle of WWII they've been working on various forms of European unification.

Only one request for my present this year, catid, but I'm not sure if you even have access to this info. If you can get Priitk to let you have ball physics so MERV can actually track a powerball when no one is carrying it, I might very well explode in joy. The possibilities..... *quivers in anticipation*.

Following is my official answer (written for one of my classes): Causality for economic growth is difficult to ascertain, even in hindsight, which makes predicting economic growth in the future even more troublesome. The European Union (EU) and European Monetary Union (EMU) are fairly recent attempts at a unified Europe, but they are not the first attempts. Since the 1940s, the nation-states of Europe have been working on how to carefully balance the need for economic stability and growth, and the want for national sovereignty. Compared to the early 20th century, Europe is now far closer to a unified continent, but is this a step in the right direction? By examining the successes and failures of the Bretton Woods and European Snake Systems, we can attempt to determine what the future holds for the EU. The economic and political ramifications of this system are tied together so strongly that despite potential benefits from a unified Europe, the history of the continent has seen each unification system crumble and eventually fail for various reasons. What has sometimes been called the “Unholy Trinity” is the idea that a country can not simultaneously control their domestic monetary policy, while allowing free capital flows across borders, and a fixed or managed exchange rate. By examining the history of the EU and EMS to date and comparing them to the previous systems, we see that the future of Europe is not in monetary and political unification. All of this, of course, is !@#$%^&*uming that unification is indeed beneficial to Europe, a claim that is questionable. The Bretton Woods System was the brainchild of a combination of British and American thinkers. John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White each wrote a plan for the international monetary order, which were the basis for the “Joint Statement” and Articles of Agreement that established the monetary system for Europe. The Keynes Plan called for a more regulated system, while the White Plan intended to have relatively free controls with an international body to veto changes. Their reasoning for each plan differed. Keynes summarized his view when he said: To suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium if we only trust to methods of laissez-faire is a doctrinaire delusion which disregards the lessons of historical experience without having behind it the support of sound theory. Yet, the comprised agreement’s quotas appeared more similar to the White Plan of free controls. The White Plan called for $5 billion, while the Keynes Plan called for $23 billion, while the final plan financed the process with $8.8 billion. Keynes was perhaps not accounting for the reality of the ability of an international body to acquire funds from the United States, as White tried to convince him in a letter. Hindsight shows that this final figure was far too small. There was a vast shortage of necessities, such as food, in Europe following the war. Under the Marshall Plan, the United States ended up extending large aid packages to Europe anyway, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created in 1948. The combination of the IMF, adjustable exchange rates, and limited capital flows were the intended mechanisms to begin economic reconstruction. The period of growth following the creation of the Bretton Woods System happened despite the system, not because of it. Because of an attempt to control domestic monetary policy, there was a lack of coordinated effort among the European powers. Countries had no option to devalue their currency to promote exports, but even if they did, there was nobody to export to. It resembled a prisoner’s dilemma – no countries wanted to import, only export, and the result was that nobody exported. A unified liberalization of capital flows would have seen a higher standard of living, but instead countries feared imports lowering their own standard of living. The Bretton Woods system sought to restrict foreign capital flows, but the investment caused by the beginning of an alliance against Communism happened despite the intended restrictions, and this was one reason behind growth. Capital from the United States entering Europe came as Keynes originally had wanted under his plan. This is the most apparent of events happening despite Bretton Woods, not because of it. If the Bretton Woods system had enacted a plan more similar to the Keynes Plan than the White Plan, this flow of capital from the United States would have begun earlier and been more effective. Bretton Woods sought to insulate against the pressures of balance of payments by limiting capital flows, but market actors learned the loopholes to cir-*BAD WORD*-vent these restrictions. This put the European states into a difficult situation. Countries had to defend parity when a readjustment might have been the correct move, else there would be an enormous outflow of capital. Even the slightest hint of readjustment might send market actors into a period of uncertainty. These attempts at parity were generally bad for the growth of Europe, and eventually for the United States’ ability to control their own currency. Bretton Woods finally collapsed with the transition to floating exchange rates in the early 1970s after it became apparent that continuation under the system could lead to economic ruin worldwide. These limits on capital flows in the Bretton Woods system resemble the caps on incentives in the European Union today. The intention of each of these systems was to level the playing field among the European states, but the reality is that the private sector suffers by being unable to move to the best location. It is not accidental that capital flows out of some countries and into others. Restrictions on these capital flows are detrimental to the economic health of the region as the private sectors become less productive. To prevent “unfair” practices, the EU caps the ability of each of their members to entice investment, at the expensive of economic prosperity. While it is true that no EU member will be able to lose investment to a neighbor, neither will they be able to lure the investment from a neighbor, and thus another tool of the EU member states to manage their economies is lost. The lesson to be learned from the Bretton Woods System is that the European powers can not effectively regulate capital flows, because each nation-state has a political responsibility to their cons!@#$%^&*uents. Bretton Woods relied on the United States to run a deficit to avoid a dollar shortage of liquidity in the world, and the crisis of the dollar proved the gold exchange standard is fundamentally flawed, what is now called the Triffin Dilemma. The dilemma suggests that to stop speculation against the dollar, the U.S.’s deficit spending would have to stop, but that would cause a liquidity crisis as the supply of dollars became too small to continue rebuilding Europe. To avoid a liquidity crisis, the U.S. would have to continue deficit spending, which would lead to destabilization of the dollar and a crisis of confidence in the United States. Bretton Woods made the !@#$%^&*umption that the U.S. would always be able to stabilize economic policy, but in the 1960s, spending on social programs and the Vietnam War led to inflation. Other governments, responsible for defending their peg rates, defended them and continued this inflation, showing the flaw in the Bretton Woods System’s ability to manage payment imbalances. The answer had to be to move to floating exchange rates. The Bretton Woods system had several flaws that are not solved in the European Union. There is still a political responsibility of each nation-state to its own cons!@#$%^&*uents, and that will not ever change. The European systems of unification can only become effective when there is a convergence in the interests of cons!@#$%^&*uents continent-wide. Unlike Bretton Woods, the EU does at least take steps to prevent reliance on the United States – in fact there is no reliance on the dollar with the creation of the Euro. These lessons were not learned quickly, however, as is demonstrated by the brief existence of the European Snake. The system of exchange rates in the 1970s was not perfectly floating. Following the Werner Report, exchange rates were allowed to float within a narrow band that was determined by a peg to the dollar. When graphed, this would look like a snake moving through a tunnel, hence the name given to it, the Snake. In 1973, when it was decided to let the dollar float as well, the “tunnel” disappeared, as the dollar was no longer stably pegged. Unlike Bretton Woods, the Snake was extremely short-lived. Britain stopped participating in 1972, Italy in 1973, and France in 1974 (although they rejoined a year later, a switch to expansionist fiscal policies forced them to leave again in 1976). The Snake was extremely ill suited to stabilizing exchange rates. The OPEC price-shock showed that the effects differed sharply from nation to nation, and a unified policy that required narrow floating exchange rates forced nations to withdraw from the system to deal with pressing domestic concerns. For instance, France’s expansionary policies during this period forced them to leave the Snake. Meanwhile, Germany made demands of the other participating nations in the Frankfurt realignment in exchange for their continued participation in the system. Various countries’ politicians and policymakers saw different responses to the shock as the correct measures to take, leading to a disunity of policy that contrasted with the motives behind the Snake. The intention of the Snake was to have Economic and Monetary Union in Europe by 1980, but by the late 1970s it became obvious this was an impossible goal. The lack of policy coordination sealed the grave of the Snake. While it may be easy to simply blame the demise of the Snake on its poor structure, the events during the time of the Snake were not especially conducive to European unity. The OPEC price-shock forced a disunity of policy, yet there is not a system in the EU to provide for similar situations. The cap on deficit spending (3% of GDP) will face a similar problem when the European economy faces a price shock – member-states will be unable to spend their way out of trouble. The EU has been lucky in that it hasn’t faced the same sort of problematic environment the Snake failed in. From the ashes of the Snake came the European Monetary System (EMS). While this system seemed to work in figuring out what to do with exchange-rates by again pegging with a slight float, unemployment was extremely high during this period. Because Germany was the anchor of the system, German desire for low inflation limited the ability of other governments to manipulate their macroeconomic policy to lower unemployment. Instead, governments used microeconomic policies to create social programs that were highly inefficient and inflexible. Despite these problems, the EMS was largely successful through the 1980s in stabilizing exchange rates. However, this changed in 1992 when, following speculative attacks in the currency market, Italy and Britain left the EMS. In 1993, the allowed fluctuation in exchange rate was increased from +/- 2.25% to +/- 15.00%. This change was following German reunification and a weakening of the dollar. This new freedom allowed currencies to revalue, but with a new margin of 30%, one had to start questioning whether the system of floating-pegs was the correct system. Under EMS, countries pursued different macroeconomic policies, and there was no attempt at setting a standard to manage inflation other than to use Germany as an anchor. In his 2001 book, Money and Power in Europe, Matthias Kaelberer suggests that “Germany’s position as standard setter lost legitimacy because other EMS members became unwilling or unable to adjust to Germany’s standard through the traditional means of domestic or external adjustment.” This is a similar reason for collapse as the Bretton Woods and Snake Systems suffered. There appears a fundamental problem in attempting to have a unified monetary system without a unified political policy. With Bretton Woods, Snake, and EMS all collapsing, a common thread became apparent; a difference in policy preference among the European nations and attempts to converge policy lead to the collapse of the system. Yet, the European Union continues the previous attempts to unify Europe. Is it a different kind of system? The EU unifies the separate nations of Europe in more ways than one. For the first time, the EU introduces a common currency, the Euro. The Euro is not a currency meant to replace, per se, the independent currencies of each member nation, but rather to compete with the dollar and the yen. For the first time there is a real European bloc, a sort of “United States of Europe” that can be compared loosely in structure to the United States of America. But the mindset of the U.S. differs from that of Europe, and this is one of the primary flaws in any ability to unify the region. Federalism in the United States was a response to the dangers external threats posed. France and Spain posed significant threats each state was incapable of dealing with alone. Europe, on the other hand, is only threatened by itself – the unification of the European states is to prevent internal conflicts. This is a different mindset, less conducive to cooperation than the U.S.’s. This difference in policies and preferences manifests in several different areas. With the creation of the Euro, there must be an attempt at convergence of monetary policy, determining an ideal unemployment rate, as well as managed inflation. Given the varying preferences (as usual, Germany’s despise of inflation takes the forefront), this alone is a challenging prospect. Yet, there are other policy differences that must be reconciled. With fifteen nations participating in the EU so far, it becomes readily apparent that a convergence of policy is impossible, even ignoring that previous attempts have failed. The EU consists of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Ten more countries will be added in 2004. There are five ins!@#$%^&*utions in the EU. The European Parliament is directly elected by the citizens of the EU. The Council of the European Union represents each member state. The European Commission, along with the previous two ins!@#$%^&*utions, all combine in the decision-making process of the EU. Along with these, the Court of Justices upholds European law, and the Court of Auditors monitors the EU finances. In addition, two important bodies in the EU are the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank. The Investment Bank is responsible for financing EU investments. The ECB controls the EU monetary policy. Unlike the United States, the EU member-states are all still independent nations, and unlike a treaty-organization, the unifying systems extend to trade, military conflict, and nearly all exercises of sovereign power. The ECB is intended to remain completely independent of the policy preferences of each participating nation, and to instead determine monetary policy that is best for the entire European bloc. This sort of organization is wholly unique as it is, in essence, pooled sovereignty. Pooled sovereignty can be a powerful tool, as the EU has already demonstrated in its tariff negotiations with the United States, but differences in policy make it hard to determine what to use that sovereignty for. Negotiating with the United States and other world powers is simpler for the group to do together, but only if they can determine what they collectively want. Some things, such as lowering the United States’ tariffs, are a simple and direct goal that all EU members can agree on. Others, such as determining internal policies or regulating programs, are not as straightforward. Aside from the practical differences among the European countries in, for instance, their balancing of inflation versus unemployment, each member state has a strong cultural history that they are weary of having !@#$%^&*imilated into a European iden!@#$%^&*y. An example is France, a country that has outlawed “franglais” (a mixture of French and English) on television. Yet, now France is supposed to share a currency with Germany? For this reason, a lot of superficial debate over the Euro took place. For instance, each state prints its own “kind” of Euro with something unique to their nation on the face of the bill. Each member-state is giving up a part of their culture to participate in the EU in an attempt to again push Europe into the forefront of world power past the United States, but at some point each member will draw the line – until this barrier disappears, there can not be a truly unified Europe. It is somewhat ironic that the EU is an attempt to promote peace and prosperity while maintaining the culture of each member state, when that culture is universally one of war and conflict. The reason for European unification was war-weariness following the destructiveness of World War II. For centuries before that war, the states of Europe had fought amongst each other. Following WWII, Europe has successfully rebuilt and not had any outright internal conflicts, that much at least can be said in praise of the new move towards unification. Yet, this peace and prosperity isn’t unique to Europe. In reality, no democratic governments wage war on each other . The peace felt in Europe can as easily be attributed to their forms of government as to their membership in the European Union. It was most likely the triumph of Democracy and Capitalism over Communism through the transfer of capital in the Marshall Plan that had the longest lasting effect on the stability of the region. This stability will likely continue into the future, regardless of the level of unification among current EU members. Like the systems preceding it, the EU attempts to coordinate policy that will inevitably lead to the failure of the system as a whole. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is essential for the coordination of fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union (EMS), and therefore vital to any attempts at unification. The most important point of this pact is to restrict the maximum budget deficit of each member state to 3 percent of GDP in the short-term and in the medium-term, a target, “close to balance or in surplus.” Already, the members of the EU are violating this maximum deficit. This problem is a manifestation of the problems each of the preceding systems had suc-*BAD WORD*-bed to. In 2002, Germany and Portugal passed the deficit cap. The United States, unhindered by the policies the EU members must adhere to, far surp!@#$%^&*es the 3% of GDP budget deficit. If two countries have already violated the SGP, what sort of long term enforceability does the pact have? If the United States is a model of economic prosperity in the modern world, is it important to note that they would never fit the requirements under the SGP? It is important to realize this, and to understand that in all likelihood the future will show more countries breaking this deficit cap when similar events to the OPEC price-shock in the 1970s occur. EU members will be unable to satisfy their cons!@#$%^&*uents while remaining part of the EU. Even if the EU manages to maintain the 3% of GDP deficit cap, it may not be an appropriate cap. The United States ran the most negative balance of payments in 2002, while Japan ran the most positive – the EU must reevaluate whether their policies dictated in the SGP are wise. Up until this point, we’ve been operating under the !@#$%^&*umption that unification is beneficial. This !@#$%^&*umption, however, must be questioned. Unification provides benefits, but has more than one harmful side effect. The loss of some cultural iden!@#$%^&*y among member-states is unavoidable, as is the loss of mobility among politicians. Similar to the choices some developing nations make to tie their hands by implementing an independent central bank to attract investors, politicians in the EU member-states have tied their own hands – but unlike the implementation of independent central banks, there isn’t a benefit immediately gained by joining the EU. The creation of an independent central bank calls for a credible commitment to not seize the bank to control monetary policy for the bank to succeed in attracting investment. There is not this credible commitment for the EU members to stand by the policies dictated in the SGP. Germany and Portugal have already violated these policies, and under previous European unification systems, politicians have chosen new domestic policies and decided to leave the group, such as France in 1976. It is important to remember that in a democracy, each new election represents a new government, one that is not entirely bound to the policies of the preceding government. Changes in policies after elections can result to changes made in the dynamic between EU members that challenges the foundations of a system. While the politicians who originally orchestrated the creation of a unification system were inevitably favorable towards cooperation, there is not a guarantee that future politicians will maintain the same policies. In reality, these politicians may see the pooling of sovereignty as a loss of their own ability to do their job. The European Union exemplifies the destruction of national sovereignty by globalization in recent years. The EU doesn’t appear to have a solution to OPEC oil-shocks which affect members in differing degrees, the problem that ended the Snake. Fiscal federalism, as Eichengreen calls it in his 1996 book Globalizing Capital, is not a solution to these differing policy needs. EU members do not have the tools to adequately deal with a price shock – their inability to spend past the deficit cap hampers their capabilities in maintaining their own nation-state’s economies. The Very-Short-Term-Financing Facility is a good idea, but in reality it is an international body telling a nation-state how they can spend their own money. We can liken the fiscal federalism of the EU/EMU to the fiscal federalism of the United States. Fiscal federalism works in the United States because the overwhelming mindset among Americans is that they are, indeed, Americans, and not New Yorkers or Missourians or Floridians. Europeans, however, are French or Dutch or German, not simply European. This intangible carries weight, it isn’t a superficial element. Nation-states are functionally equal, but not equally capable. All states collect taxes, for instance, but do the citizens willingly give their money to the government, or does the government need to kick down doors and send goons as tax collectors? This difference can largely be determined by the idea of common destiny. If the people in a democracy see a common good, they will be more cooperative. The problem in European unification is that common destiny is nation-specific, not continent-specific. Because of this lack of common destiny among all Europeans, fiscal federalism is a challenging prospect. This poor implementation of fiscal federalism is readily visible by comparing Germany’s inflation-killing tactics to the rest of Europe’s desire for low unemployment. Under the EMS, it was the German Bundesbank that provided the anchor for Europe’s monetary policy, but under the EU/EMU there is not one country determining policy. In the EMU, it is the European Central Bank that determines monetary policy without favoring any country over another. Yet, the Governing Council of the ECB is inevitably always filled with members from each country. The United States provides a reasonable model for understanding this system. In the U.S. Congress, each member is supposed to vote for what is best for the country, yet inevitably votes for what is best for their cons!@#$%^&*uents. This is where James Madison feared democracy might become too risk-averse and unable to reach decisions when he wrote in the Federalist Papers. Likewise, the ECB, as well as all the other EU/EMU ins!@#$%^&*utions, has inevitable and unavoidable inherent problems. The intention is to be neutral, or to not have any connection to politicians, but this connection must be present. One might try to counter this argument by pointing to the congress of the United States and calling it a success, but compare the cons!@#$%^&*uents of each state represented in the U.S. to those in the EU. The U.S. is far more homogeneous, largely because of the history of the nation and the mindset of her people. It is highly unlikely that the French are very favorable to their politicians when a new policy favoring Germans over themselves is announced. Any attempt to remain neutral is impossible; there is always going to be a difference between the policy objectives of each nation-state. This difference, and inability to converge on an agreeable set of policies, has been a component of the downfall of each of the systems of unification that preceded the EU, and will be a component in the failure of the EU as well. While the EU has been fairly successful to date, the system has not yet been challenged by the same threats that the preceding systems dealt with. Price shocks and changes in domestic policies in member states will result in clashing over policy issues. The nations joining the EU in the near future will only serve to further add to the overwhelming group of conflicting policy desires. There is an inherent difference between each member-state of the EU due to a culture of conflict and war with the other member-states, and there is no immediate feeling of common destiny. The loss of cultural uniqueness and sovereignty may be too much for some member-states to bear, which will become apparent when the EU faces significant economic threats through price shocks or compe!@#$%^&*ion with other regions. The EU does have an advantage over the past systems in that they have moved closer to monetary unification with the Euro, but there are still significant problems with a loss of sovereignty in the ability to manipulate their own currency. An inability to tailor policy to domestic situations leaves politicians without an important tool to satisfy cons!@#$%^&*uents. Policy is instead tailored towards what is considered best for the entire European bloc, which ends up stifling the abilities of each member-state to provide important incentives to lure foreign investment, and in reality, compete with the United States and Asian financial centers. At least, unlike the Bretton Woods system, the new EU appears to be taking Keynes’ original ideas to heart. This system is less laissez-faire than any of the preceding; it is a true grouping of powerful ins!@#$%^&*utions that represent the European people and economy. There is no doubt that the EU has met moderate success, but then again many considered Bretton Woods in the same light in its very short-term ability to turn around the economies in Europe. However, like Bretton Woods, the Snake, and EMS, the EU will not last indefinitely into the future – some unpredictable event will show the inherent problems in unifying Europe. If nothing else, the inability to abide by The Stability and Growth Act will lead to sanctions on many European nation-states, further hurting their economies. Like the systems before it, the moderate prosperity in Europe is despite the EU/EMU, not because of it, and at some point in this century this will become apparent and seal the fate of another failed attempt at European unification.

This judge doesn't own the building, what rights does he have to do what he wants with the interior design. Lets be reasonable people. There are three versions of the Ten Commandments in the (Old Testament). They are at Exodus 20:2-17, Exodus 34:12-26, and Deuteronomy 5:6-21. 2nd Commandment; Verses 4-6: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me. And shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments." OOPS! The Sistine Chapel DONE -*BAD WORD*-ED UP! Painting a likeness of heaven above? HEATHEN. 3rd Commandment; Verse 7: "Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain; for the LORD will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain." God -*BAD WORD*-, you're ALL going to -*BAD WORD*-. 4th Commandment; Verses 8-11: "Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work: But the seventh day is the sabbath of the LORD thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: For in six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it." I don't get it ... do Christians carefully overlook this rule, and kinda sweep it under the rug? Ever mow your lawn on a saturday? Oops, you're going to -*BAD WORD*-. Here is a good one for you anti-death penalty people: 6th Commandment; Verse 13: "Thou shalt not kill." Genesis 9:6: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man." Exodus 22:20: "He that sacrificeth unto any god, save unto the LORD only, he shall be utterly destroyed." Deuteronomy 13:1-10 states that a person who tries to convince an Israelite to convert to another religion must be killed Leviticus 20:27 calls for the execution by stoning of all mediums and spiritists. Oh, and if you have sex before you're married... Deuteronomy 22:13-21 concludes that your girlfriend be stoned to death. I would say you're all going to -*BAD WORD*-, but most of you haven't boned a chick, dead or alive. ZING. The ten commandments was first a Jewish thing, so back off crazies. This country was also not founded on Christianity. When you say founded, I can only assume you mean the Cons!@#$%^&*ution, and if you read any of the federalist papers, you'll realize it was pretty clear there was a direct intention to NOT make it a Christian government. If by "christian" you simply mean they follow rules like the ten commandments, and general morality, I'm going to have to go ahead and call that a blatant disregard for defining what you're talking about - if they follow rules like thou shalt not kill, I think that'd make it much closer to a Jewish government, who has no "central authority" like Catholicism for example. Do you mean that they intended people to go to church on sunday, confess their sins, pray with rosary beads, put wafers under their tongues, cross themselves? I don't see jack squat about that in any legal do-*BAD WORD*-ent ever - so I'm going to have to go ahead and firmly, !@#$%^&*uredly, repeatedly, and redundantly deny your claim that the United States government has any affiliation with Christianity in any way. Anyway, would you care for me to explain how Christianity became "the most widespread religion in the world" ... because it sure isn't from the nice deeds of some guy named Jesus. See... Christians killed everyone else, and the plague helped the fall of Islam right along. Yum. In 2000, the world was: 33% Christian (and dropping) 20% Islamic (and growing) 13% Hindu (not changing) 6% Buddhist (not changing) (SOURCE) While it may be incorrect to say that Christians have been wrong, its equally incorrect to say the other 67% of the world is wrong. See, no one denies that Jesus existed - its the fact that he was the supposed son of God. See, no one denies that Count Dracula existed either - his name was Vlad the Impaler, you can do your own research on him. Now, I find it just as hard to believe Jesus was the son of God as it is to believe that good 'ol Vlad was a bloodsucking immortal. Arguing about any religion as right or wrong is pointless, because people can believe or disbelieve whatever they want, and no matter of yelling and arguing can change that, and yes, arguing about it is stupid. However, I refuse to let people get away with many completely incorrect statements or blatantly making !@#$%^&*umptions they can not make - please stop making them (way too many ppl have done it, I can't point out every one). Its stuff like this that gets my goose... Plus, I'm completely comfortable calling any religion or group that blatantly oppresses their people wrong. Do you agree with this? I want you, before continuing, to say YES or NO out loud. Good. Some groups oppose .... homosexualality? Its... a sin... to... have a mutually agreed upon relationship with ... anyone? Umm... human rights violation. And if the 10 Commandments say that no god may be worshipped before the God of Judiasm (which is what he is, btw. Zing.) - it would be illegal to be part of Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Wicca and hundreds of other religions. How can you put up a do-*BAD WORD*-ent that says "Jews, Christians, and Muslims only. All others, HEATHEN!" You can't put up the 10 commandments in a government building because that blatant oppresses people. On the other hand, these people can still put it up in their homes, or even on their front lawns.

Will the EU survive? Consider the Bretton Woods and European Snake. Consider cultural, currency, political, and finiancial differences. Consider current success and failure of the European system - the Euro as a strong currency, France's declining African power based on the franc, the rejection by the brits, budget deficit caps, german inflation-hatred, and Russian instability. Consider the effect of the entrance of Slovakia and the Czechs, on the short list. Consider the capping of individual state FDI incentives. Consider the U.S. as an example of the uniting of states. Discuss.

how are those soccer players... lol

Soccer players, ship radius 7. Go wild Make as many different ones as you want ... 8 is not the limit. They should all look similar enough to know they're soccer players, but easily be able to tell the difference (u know, different uniform colors). The background is a darkgreen, so be aware of that when u design it, if you design anything.

Uh. Key point of the post "this doesnt not happen on any other phpBB forums except this one". I'm telling you because it might be your fault

And I'm saying there will never be a "car". The point is, nothing ever happens exactly as it is defined - definitions losely encomp!@#$%^&* the idea behind what something is. There has never been, and never will be: anarchy, communism, democracy, dictatorships, oligarchies. Should I continue?

Starting maybe yesterday, SSforum refuses to "keep me logged in" ... the cookie must not be staying on my computer, because when I close the browser and come back, I'm logged out. This isn't happening on any other phpBBs I frequent. Any ideas?

And please stop making horribly argued, and cliched comments: There is no such thing as anarchy. There is no such thing as democracy. There also is no such thing as a car. There is no example of the absolute true manifestation of "a car". Every example of cars in our reality are interpretations, improvements, and manifestations of the theory of a car. By your line of reasoning, there is no such thing as anything.

dude, please add that to the forum smilies. Just that - everything else will be cute smiley faces.... then there is :raar: